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1DISCRIMINATING  TRIGGERS  FOR  MANDATORY  DECLARATIONS
by  Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.    Declarations were identified as one of the principal measures by the Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts (known as VEREX) which identified and examined potential
verification measures from a technical and scientific viewpoint during 1992 and 1993.    At
the third meeting of VEREX, a working paper1 was produced by the rapporteur, Annabelle
Duncan of Australia, which provided the evaluation of declarations.  The Introduction to this
working paper stated that
"Declarations were considered to be a major off–site measure from which national
profiles or patterns of biological activity could be assessed against other sources of
information.  Using the declaration mechanism, nations could share information
regarding biological activities and could, in effect explain to States Parties activities
which may otherwise cause compliance concerns."
2.   The capabilities of declarations were set out as being:
"Declarations could build up a picture of the approaches to microbiological work,
health and safety in a country.  This may lead to an understanding of the approaches
taken in a country to work on micro–organisms and toxins, against which initial
judgements of consistency could be made.  They could help to put in context other
information, providing a basis for discounting incorrect or unsubstantiated reports
which might otherwise give rise to costly on–site verification measures.
Declarations could, with other measures, provide a graduated response to compliance
concerns.  Concerns raised by, for example, detection of activities via remote sensing
or information monitoring may be allayed by simple notification in response to a
request.  When discrepancies persist between the declared information and that
obtained by other verification measures, more expensive and time consuming
verification measures (e.g. inspections) could be necessary.
It is envisaged that declarations will be important in both the general and focused
phases of verification.  Thus certain items/events could be declared on a regular basis
by all States Parties.  Other items/events could be declared (notified) as required e.g.
information regarding key equipment may only be declared in the preparatory stage of
a more focused inquiry such as an inspection."
Limitations were also addressed and included:
"A major limitation of declarations is that their utility depends upon their accuracy.
No nation would declare a prohibited activity as such, but non–declaration of a facility
                                                
1United Nations, Declarations (Rapporteur:  Ms.  A  Duncan),   BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 156, reproduced
in BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/9, Geneva, 1993, pages 166-173.
2known by other verification means to exist could give rise to compliance concerns.
Thus, declarations alone may not provide verification of the BWC but they are
strongly synergistic with other measures.
Declarations may give an uneven picture of activity in the biological field.  For
example, nations which impose Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) codes upon
industry are likely to have necessary information about their biological industries at
hand, whereas those nations where there is little government control or regulation of
biological industry may find it more difficult to provide relevant information.  This
situation should improve as more nations adopt international codes of practice such as
GMP."
3.   Finally, further useful points were included in its agreed summary:
"Declarations, if properly structured, could be an important mechanism for building
up a picture of the biological activities in a nation.  They give a nation the opportunity
to explain actions or events to States Parties which may otherwise cause compliance
concerns.  The veracity of such explanations can be judged against the patterns of
activity in biological sciences built up over time.....
On balance, it would appear from this evaluation that declarations have a high status
in terms of potential utility.  There is however a need to consider in more detail
exactly what items/events should be declared."
4.  Definitions were defined in the final report2 of VEREX as:
"Mandatory, periodic reporting on a regular basis of information considered to be of
relevance for verification of the BWC.  The nature of the events/items/facilities to be
declared has yet to be fully defined.  Notifications were considered to be a subset of
declarations, concerned with the reporting of new or unforeseen events or forecast of
events in order to pre–empt compliance concerns."
5.   The Special Conference held in September 1994 at the request of a majority of the States
Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention saw the presentation of a number of
working papers and national statements by States Parties.   Several of these touched on the
importance of declarations.   Thus,  Brazil said3 that:
"It has become clear that a system of national declarations would be useful as a
starting point for the BWC Verification system.  As stated at VEREX III,
"declarations to microbiological work, health and safety in a country ... against which
initial judgements of consistency could be made".  It seems necessary to discuss
carefully what types of facilities should be included in national declarations, in order
to account for all facilities posing a real compliance concern, and only those."
                                                
2United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification
Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint,  BWC/CONF.  III/VEREX/9, Geneva, 1993.
3Brazil, Strengthening the BWC: Elements for a Possible Verification Regime,  BWC/SPCONF/WP.4, Special
Conference of the States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 21 September 1994.
3and Ambassador Nasseri of Iran said4:
"Let me state this clearly.  Strengthening of the Convention through verification
mechanisms and enhancing its effectiveness presupposes universality and requires
unqualified support of all members.  Members are expected to commit themselves to
submit declarations, accede to the demands of verification and accept the
indispensable costs."
6.  A joint working paper by China, India and Iran said5:
"While it was agreed that reliance could not be placed on any single measure by itself,
the measures described under the headings "declaration" and "off–site" were most
frequently identified as the most desirable ones."
and South Africa identified6 possible verification measures as including:
"The introduction of mandatory declarations.  South Africa is of the opinion that
declarations should form the nucleus of any verification regime as well as the
substance of confidence building measures.  Declarations should, however, not
contain information that would threaten proprietary rights.  Declarations are also not
of much value for preventing proliferation if they are not verified in some way.
Confirmation of security provisions at a facility, the nature of containment facilities,
the presence of equipment for declared activities and changes in previously declared
status, are all areas of useful information which can be verified during on–site visits
without threatening commercial confidentiality."
7.   It is therefore apparent from the VEREX evaluation that there is agreed language that
"declarations have a high status in terms of potential utility" and that "Declarations were
considered to be a major off–site measure from which national profiles or patterns of
biological activity could be assessed against other sources of information".  There is
agreement that "It is envisaged that declarations will be important in both the general and
focused phases of verification".   The subsequent work by the Ad Hoc Group has further
demonstrated that there is very wide international agreement that declarations have a central
role to play in a strengthened BTWC.
Required Declarations
8.   In a paper7 to the 4th Pugwash CBW Workshop in December 1995 which was developed
further for the conference held in Bonn in May 1996 at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and
                                                
4 Statement by H. E. Ambassador Sirous Nasseri, Head of Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Special Conference of the States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 20 September
1994.
5China, India and Iran, Working Paper by China, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), BWC/SPCONF/WP.15,
Special Conference of the States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 22 September
1994.
6 South Africa, Mandate to Strengthen the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, BWC/SPCONF/WP.11,
Special Conference of the States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 22 September
1994.
4published8 in the book of that conference, I stressed the necessity of distinguishing clearly
between
a.  the trigger for the declaration and
b.  the information to be provided within a declaration.
The difference between triggers and the information to be provided can be illustrated by
considering the requirements for the confidence-building measures  agreed at the Second
Review Conference9 in 1986 and extended at the Third Review Conference10 in 1991.   The
triggers and information to be provided are set out in the Table below.
TABLE:   CBM  TRIGGERS  AND  INFORMATION  TO  BE  PROVIDED
    CBM          Trigger      Information to be provided
A  Part  1 Facility having maximum
containment laboratory
meeting criteria for BL4 or
P4
Name
Organisation or company
Locations and postal address
Source(s) of financing
Number of maximum containment units with
indication of size (m2)
Scope and general description of activities,
including type(s) of microorganisms and/or toxins
as appropriate
                                                                                                                                                       
7Graham S Pearson, The Role of Declarations in a Strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), Working Paper, Pugwash Meeting no. 212, 2-3 December 1995, Geneva, Switzerland.
8Graham S Pearson, Improving the Biological Weapons Convention:  The Role of Lists and Declarations, in
Oliver Thranert (ed) Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, Verlag J H W Dietz, Bonn, 1996.
9United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva 8–26 September 1986, BWC/CONF.II/13, Geneva 1986.
10United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
5A  Part  2 National biological
defence research and
development programmes
Objective and summary of the R&D activities
indicating whether work is conducted in a list of
10 areas, whether contractor or other non-defence
facilities are used and its funding.
Organizational structure of the programme and its
reporting relationships
Information on defence and other governmental
facilities in which the biological R&D programme
is concentrated
a.  Location
b.  Floor area (m2) of the facilities including BL2,
BL3 and BL4
c.  Total number of staff employed
d.  Number of staff in the categories: civilian,
military, scientist, technicians, engineers. support
and administrative staff
e.  A list of the scientific disciplines of the
scientific/engineering staff
f.  The source and funding levels in research,
development and test and evaluation
g.  The policy regarding publication and a list of
publicly-available papers and reports.
6B Outbreaks of infectious
diseases and similar
occurrences caused by
toxins and on all such
events that seem to deviate
from the normal pattern
Background information on outbreaks of
reportable infectious diseases.
Information on outbreaks that seem to deviate
from the normal pattern
-  Time of cognizance of outbreak
-  Location and approximate area
-  Type of disease and intoxination
-  Possible causative agents
-  Main characteristic of systems
-  Detailed symptoms
-  Deviations from normal pattern
-  Number of primary cases
-  Number of total cases
-  Number of deaths
-  Development of outbreak
- Measures taken
C Encouragement of
publication of results and
promotion of knowledge
Information on policy on publication of results
- including at facilities declared under CBM A
- including outbreaks declared under CBM B
Information on relevant scientific journals
generally available to States Parties
D Promotion of contacts
between scientists
Information on planned international conferences
Information on opportunities for exchange of
scientists and joint research
E Declaration of legislation,
regulations and other
measures
Information on whether States Parties have
legislation, regulations and other measures related
to
  - Article I
  - Export of micro-organisms and toxins
  - Import of micro-organisms and toxins
F Past offensive or defensive
biological research and
development programmes
Date of entering into force of BWC for State Party
Period of activities
Summary of research and development activities
indicating whether work carried out in particular
areas identified in the CBM
7G Facilities providing
vaccines licensed by the
State Party for the
protection of humans
Name of facility
Location (mailing address)
General description of types of diseases covered
In the May 1996 paper, I concluded that:
 "The information to be provided in declarations needs to be structured so as to give a
comprehensive appreciation of the facility/programme/event.   Careful attention needs
to be given to clarity in indicating what is required in the declaration whilst leaving
sufficient scope for the declarer to include as much information as is considered to be
helpful in providing transparency.
Carefully crafted requirements to trigger declarations and modalities for each
declaration to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided will
strengthen the Convention by increasing transparency and building confidence over
time in compliance.   The aim must be to declare those facilities/
programmes/events most relevant to the Convention, recognise that all
information of possible relevance will not be declared and avoid requirements to
provide information that is not of direct relevance.    The most effective and
practical way of identifying the optimum triggers and contents for declarations will be
through the analysis of national evaluations of the proposed triggers and declarations
as this will give a valuable insight into their practicality, feasibility and
effectiveness."[Emphasis added]
9.   The past two years has seen considerable progress made by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG)
which has through successive Friend of the Chair papers taken forward the concept of
declarations so that the rolling text annexed to the procedural report11 of the July 1997 AHG
meeting has in Article III. D text which identifies the triggers for declarations whilst the
information to be provided within a declaration is elaborated in Annexe A.    The triggers
identified in the BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36 version of the rolling text, with square brackets
as indicated, are:
[A.  [Military] [Biological Defence] Programmes [against biological and toxin
weapons]
[B.  [Military] [Biological Defence] Facilities [taking part in defence programmes
against biological and toxin weapons]
C.  Past Biological and Toxin Offensive and Defensive Programmes
                                                
11United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36,  4 August 1997.
8D.   Vaccine Production
[E.   Plant Inoculant and/or Biocontrol Agent Production Facilities with Plant
Quarantine Capacity
F.   [[High] [Maximum] Containment Facilities
G.  [Facilities Working with Listed Agents/Toxins
H.  [[Other Production Facilities]  [Production Facilities not Working with Listed
Agents]
I.   [Other Relevant Facilities [not Working with Listed Agents]
[J.  Transfers
[K.  Appearance of outbreaks of disease or epidemics
It will be noted that several of these triggers (such as C, D, F and K) carry forward into the
rolling text and develop the triggers for the Confidence-Building Measures.
10.   In considering declarations it is necessary to ensure that the requirements are guided by
practical considerations.    A requirement to declare all facilities of possible relevance to the
BTWC would be ineffective, impracticable and result in information overload.   In addition,
States Parties would have no confidence that all facilities which should have been declared
under such a requirement had in fact been declared -- either within their own State or in
another State.    For an effective verification regime, the facilities declared must be those of
most relevance to the Convention and the trigger requirements need to be precise and free
from ambiguity.   A pragmatic approach suggests that a requirement to declare 10s of
facilities within a State rather than 100s of facilities is more likely to be implemented
effectively and accurately by all State Parties thus building confidence that those facilities
which should be declared have indeed been declared.
11.   A number of States Parties have carried out surveys of their national microbiological
capabilities using questionnaires designed to elucidate how many facilities would require to
be declared should certain trigger requirements be included in the legally binding instrument.
These are highly informative and, taken together, indicate pragmatic approaches to effective
declarations of the facilities most relevant to the Convention.
12.   The first two such surveys were reported at the November/December 1995 AHG
meeting by Canada and the Netherlands.   The working paper12 by Canada considered a
number of triggers:
* Level of biocontainment
* Military microbiology
* Aerobiology
* Work with listed pathogens and toxins
* Production microbiology; and
                                                
12Canada, Discussion Paper on Declarations:  List of Agents and Combinations of Criteria,   BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/WP. 6, 28 November 1995.
9* Genetic engineering/biotechnology
The outcome was a conclusion that two of the triggers if used on their own would be
impracticable as requiring many hundreds of facilities to be declared:
* Working with listed pathogens and toxins  -- some 750 facilities
* Genetic engineering/biotechnology -- between 600 and 700 facilities
More practical triggers were those for
* Military microbiology -- one military facility and 19 non-military facilities
* Production microbiology -- 30 facilities
Possible problems were identified with the other two triggers of biocontainment and
aerobiology;  in both cases the point was made that the most relevant aspects might well be
caught as information to be provided under the other triggers of military microbiology and
production microbiology.    The Canadian paper in considering combinations of triggers
concluded that
a.  Military microbiology as a stand-alone criterion, and
b.  Any activity in combination with listed pathogens and toxins
would be effective triggers.
13.   The Netherlands paper13 described the outcome of a survey which had considered a
number of triggers:
* Military and military related biodefence programmes/facilities
* High containment facilities
* Work with listed pathogens and toxins
* Aerobiology/aerosol dissemination
* Production microbiology
* Genetic manipulation
* Equipment
The paper concluded that two of the triggers might be applicable on a stand alone basis:
* Military microbiology -- one facility
* BL 4 High containment -- no facility in the Netherlands
Insofar as the other triggers were concerned, the paper concluded that such triggers in
isolation would probably catch too many facilities not of direct relevance to the Convention.
Four combinations of triggers were identified as being needed to select the most relevant
facilities:
                                                
13The Netherlands, The Relevance and Effectiveness of (Combinations of) Criteria for Declaration,  BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/WP.10, 28 November 1995.
10
* Production microbiology in combination with work with listed pathogens and toxins
-- four facilities with animal/human pathogens/toxins and two facilities with 
plant pathogens
* Production microbiology in combination with biocontainment level (BL3 and in
some cases BL2)
* Aerobiology  in combination with work with listed pathogens and toxins
* Aerobiology  in combination with work with biocontainment level (BL3 and in
some cases BL2)
14.   At the next AHG meeting in July 1996, the UK reported14 on a survey of
microbiological facilities which had used the following triggers:
* Military and militarily related biodefence
* Biocontainment
* Work with [listed] pathogens or toxins
* Genetic modification (genetic manipulation)
* Production microbiology
* Aerobiology and aerosol dissemination
No conclusions were drawn in the paper about the effectiveness or otherwise of the various
triggers.   However, information was provided as to the number of facilities which reported
activities under the individual triggers together with comments about the relevance of such
sites to the Convention.
* Military and militarily related biodefence -- Not mentioned further in the paper
* Biocontainment -- BL3 trigger would catch hundreds of facilities
* Work with [listed] pathogens or toxins -- 90 facilities
* Genetic modification (genetic manipulation) -- 170 facilities, many considered to be
of low relevance
* Production microbiology -- over 170 sites, many not considered of sufficient
relevance to justify declaration
*  Generic production activities (as listed below) -- 62 sites
 -- production of vaccines for humans
-- production of vaccines for animals
-- production of medicines by fermentation
-- production of antibiotics
-- production of biopesticides/insecticides
-- production of single cell protein eg for animal food
* Aerobiology and aerosol dissemination -- 17 sites
The following conclusions can be drawn from the information provided, although these are
not explicitly drawn in the paper:
a.   BL 3 as a stand alone trigger would catch too many facilities.
b.   Genetic manipulation as a stand alone trigger would catch too many facilities.
c.   Production microbiology would catch too many facilities.
d.   Generic production activities would offer greater utility
e.   Potential production capability would catch too many facilities
                                                
14United Kingdom, Survey of Microbiological Facilities in the UK,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 81, 23 July
1996.
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15.   The March 1997 AHG meeting saw a paper15 from Italy reporting on a survey of
microbiological facilities.   This survey had used the following triggers:
* Military and militarily related biodefence programmes/facilities
* Biocontainment
* Work with listed pathogens or toxins
* Aerobiology /aerosol dissemination
* Production microbiology
* Genetic manipulation
* Vectors
The results were as follows:
a. Military and militarily related biodefence programmes/facilities -- 1 facility -- a
highly relevant criteria.
b. Biocontainment -- 3 facilities with BL4
      -- 20 with BL3
      -- 20 with BL2
     BL 4 could be a stand-alone trigger as only limited number of facilities.
BL3 and BL2 as a stand alone trigger was not particularly useful.   Better if 
combined with production capability or production capability and work with 
listed agents.
c. Work with listed pathogens or toxins -- 44 facilities
   -- 17 declared production capability
   -- 5 declared genetic manipulation
Work with listed agents as a stand alone trigger is of little relevance.  More 
significance if combined with production capability and/or genetic
manipulation.
d. Aerobiology /aerosol dissemination -- 1 facility declared release of non-listed plant 
agents
As a stand alone trigger of little relevance.   Might have utility if combined
with listed agents.
e.  Production microbiology -- 55 facilities
As a stand alone trigger a number of facilities of little or no impact on the 
BTWC are caught.   Increase relevance by combination with listed agents
and/or genetic manipulation.
f.  Genetic manipulation -- 21 facilities
As a stand alone trigger not meaningful.   Some relevance when nucleic acids 
belonging to or related to listed agents are involved.
g.  Vectors -- 1 facility.
Insufficient information to draw a conclusion.
                                                
15Italy, National Survey in the Microbiological Activities,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 146, 18 March 1997.
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16.  The following triggers were identified as being those which would capture the
facilities/sites of most relevance to the Convention:
- Military and military related biodefence programmes/facilities
- BL 4
- BL 3 and/or BL 2 & Microbiological production
- Work with listed agents and toxins & Microbiological production
- Work with listed agents and toxins & Genetic manipulation
- Work with listed agents and toxins & Aerobiology
- Microbiological production & Genetic manipulation
40 facilities would require to be declared by Italy if these were the triggers used for
declarations in the legally binding instrument.
17.   A survey16 by the five Nordic countries was reported at the July 1997 AHG meeting.
This involved some 11 triggers:
1. Work with listed agents and toxins or genetic modification to change pathogenicity
or virulence (excluding diagnostic work only)
2. Production capability & work with listed agents
3. Production of human and animal vaccines
4. Production of antibiotics by fermentation
5. Production of therapeutics by fermentation (excluding vaccines and/or antibiotics)
6. Production of other microbial components by fermentation in a closed system
7. BL 4 containment
8. BL 3 containment
9. Production area with OECD containment Category 3 or 2
10. Studies of microbial pathogens in aerosol chambers or outside environment
11. Involved in national biological defence programme or related biodefence activities
50 facilities were triggered by one or more of the above triggers.   All but one of the facilities
was caught by trigger 1 (work with listed agents or genetic manipulation).  40 were triggered
by trigger 6 (production of other microbial components) and 37 were triggered by trigger 9
(production areas with OECD Cat 3 or Cat 2 containment).    The paper concludes that the
number of facilities -- 50 --  triggered in the five Nordic countries would be fairly limited.  It
is also noted that the information given in the declaration format used in the trial would
provide a general picture of the scientific areas and the production capabilities in areas of
peaceful uses relevant to the BTWC.   It is concluded that the collected information would
increase transparency and build confidence between States parties.
Analysis and Conclusions
18.   The surveys thus far reported have been for Canada, the Netherlands, United Kingdom,
Italy and the five Nordic Countries.     The results can be summarised as follows:
Trigger utility Canada Netherlands UK Italy Nordic
Military biodefence Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Biocontainment + other BL 4 + other BL 4 + other
                                                
16Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Results of a Facility Declaration Trial in the Five Nordic
Countries,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 173, 18 July 1997.
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Listed agents Not alone Not alone Not alone + other Yes
Genetic modification Not alone Not alone Not alone Not alone Yes
Production microbiology Yes + listed agents
+ biocontain
Not alone + listed agents + other
Aerobiology + other + listed agents
+ biocontain
- + listed agents + other
Most of the surveys give an indication of the number of facilities which would need to be
declared if certain triggers, or combinations of triggers, were to be used to capture those
facilities of most relevance to the Convention.   In these surveys, the triggers or combinations
used generally included military biodefence and BL 4 containment as stand alone triggers and
production microbiology in combination with work on listed agents as one of several
combined triggers.   The conclusions reached by Canada in its survey reported in November
1995 that triggers could be military microbiology, as a stand alone trigger, and the other
proposed triggers (eg production microbiology) in combination with listed agents and toxins,
have thus turned out to be largely confirmed by the subsequent surveys so far reported by
other States Parties.  The numbers to be declared if triggers such as these were to be used can
be summarised  as:
Canada Netherland
s
UK Italy Nordic
Number of facilities to be
declared
30 to 50 [Tens] - 40 50
19.   The surveys thus far reported have been for developed countries which, with the
exception of Canada, have all been located in Europe.   The  broad conclusion that emerges is
that the number of facilities in each country that would need to be declared under triggers
chosen to capture those facilities of most relevance to the Convention would be relatively
limited with numbers of the order of 10s in each country.   As it is unlikely that in developing
countries there would be as many facilities that would need to be declared, the adoption of
triggers based on military microbiology and high containment (BL 4) as a stand alone
triggers, and combination triggers such as production microbiology together with work on
listed agents and toxins would appear to be practicable and effective in capturing those
facilities of most relevance to the Convention.
 20.   It is recommended that other States Parties, especially those in the developing world
such as Brazil, India and South Africa, should carry out similar surveys of their
microbiological facilities using questionnaires similar to those used in the surveys already
reported to the AHG.   In addition, the Russian Federation and the United States should also
carry out similar surveys to see whether military microbiology and high containment as stand
alone triggers and combination triggers such as production microbiology together with work
on listed agents and toxins would be equally applicable in capturing the most relevant
facilities in their countries.
21.  The triggers being considered in the rolling text, as noted in para 9 above, include several
which carry forward and develop the triggers for the Confidence-Building Measures.  These
developments are welcomed even though there are still square brackets which have to be
removed.   The following comments are made on the triggers in the rolling text:
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[A.  [Military] [Biological Defence] Programmes [against biological and toxin
weapons]
[B.  [Military] [Biological Defence] Facilities [taking part in defence programmes
against biological and toxin weapons]
In both A and B the removal of the limitation to "research and development" which
appears in the corresponding CBM (CBM A Part (ii)) is greatly welcomed.
C.  Past Biological and Toxin Offensive and Defensive Programmes
This trigger has yet to have the limitation "research and development" which also
appears in the corresponding CBM (CBM F) removed.   Whilst the addition of
"[testing and production]" indicates a move in the right direction, it would be far more
preferable to remove the words "research and development" so that the requirement is
simply to declare "past offensive and/or defensive programmes".     Such a simplified
trigger will achieve greater transparency and confidence.
D.   Vaccine Production
This trigger has the useful and welcome extension, albeit currently in square brackets,
to "[and animals][and plant inoculants]".   The term "[licensed by the State Party]"
could usefully be deleted thereby achieving greater transparency.
[E.   Plant Inoculant and/or Biocontrol Agent Production Facilities with Plant
Quarantine Capacity
F.   [[High] [Maximum] Containment Facilities
The removal of the qualification "research centres and laboratories" which appears in
the CBM (CBM A Part (i)) and its replacement by the term "facilities" is greatly
welcomed.
G.  [Facilities Working with Listed Agents/Toxins
H.  [[Other Production Facilities]  [Production Facilities not Working with Listed
Agents]
I.   [Other Relevant Facilities [not Working with Listed Agents]
[J.  Transfers
[K.  Appearance of outbreaks of disease or epidemics
It continues to be debatable the extent to which the BTWC should require or become
involved in the reporting of outbreaks of disease.   There is no advantage to be gained
from the BTWC regime setting up any duplication of existing, more effective disease
reporting systems.    The initiatives being taken elsewhere to strengthen the reporting
of all outbreaks of disease should be encouraged.
15
22.  It has to be remembered that the aim is to achieve an effective set of mandatory
declarations from all States Parties that focussed on the most relevant facilities, are
practicable and will build transparency and confidence whilst not seeking to capture all
facilities of possible relevance.    The negotiations in the AHG are leading towards a broad
consensus that declarations should be made of the following:
a.  Military Biological Defence Programmes and Facilities
b.  Past Biological and Toxin Offensive and Defensive Programmes
c.  Vaccine production facilities
d.  Maximum containment (BL 4) facilities
The national microbiological surveys thus far reported to the AHG indicate that such triggers
together with combination triggers such as production microbiology together with work on
listed pathogens and toxins would be effective in capturing those facilities of most relevance
to the Convention, would involve practicable numbers of declarations and would not result in
information overload.
23.   Further consideration needs to be given to the other proposed triggers such as production
capabilities not working on listed agents yet have high primary containment and could be
turned quite quickly into facilities producing biological agents.    Those States Parties which
have already carried out national microbiological surveys should be able to provide
information from those surveys which would indicate the feasibility and practicality of the
other proposed triggers.
24.  The requirement is thus for developing countries and for the Russian Federation and the
United States to carry out national microbiological surveys, using questionnaires similar to
those used in the surveys already reported to the AHG, to confirm the practicality of the
triggers identified in para 22 above.   All States Parties who have carried out such national
microbiological surveys should be encouraged to analyse their data to evaluate the feasibility
and practicality of the other triggers.   Such moves should enable a coherent set of triggers for
declarations to be developed that will be both effective and practical in contributing to the
legally binding instrument for a strengthened BTWC.
